A little more on D notices

Further to my initial post of a couple days ago [1] which gained a fair amount of interest, I  asked two more questions, before Andrew felt my questions “burdensome”.

Dear Andrew Vallance,

Thank you for [the] reply in the spirit of transparency. It is very
useful. As a follow up may I ask is the Code of Confidentiality written
down, and how is it agreed between the parties and is it possible
to publish a copy?

Yours sincerely,
Cathy Fox

From: Andrew Vallance 1 December 2014

Dear Cathy Fox,

The code of confidentiality is simply an understanding between all elements of the UK media and the government that the information they entrust to the DPBAC Secretariat will not be shared with a third party without their specific permission. It safeguards the privacy and security of media sources and editorial decisions. As I said in my previous email, it forms the foundation stone of the DA Notice System. If I compromised the information I was given by individual news outlets to a third party, they would not trust me with their stories in the future and the whole DA Notice System would be undermined with serious consequences for UK national security, i.e. for your life and mine amongst many others.

Sincerely,
Andrew Vallance

From: Cathy Fox  2 December 2014

Dear Andrew Vallance,

Thank you for the speedy reply.

I would be grateful if you could answer the following questions, as
many people are finding your replies useful and transparent.

I understand the need for confidentiality, what I was trying to
understand was the method of agreement. Is it written, is it spoken
about or is it just assumed without saying?

Is it possible for you to give the definition of national security
that you use?

In this link http://courtnewsuk.co.uk/newsgallery/?news_id=38995 [2]
Michael Shrimpton ” claims to have the authority to issue a Defence
Advisory Notice on behalf of the government to stop British media
from publishing stories that could compromise national security.”
‘If I wanted to keep a story out of the press I would get in
contact with the D-notice department,’ Shrimpton said.

Did Michael Shrimpton have this authority he claimed and has he
contacted the D notice Department in this regard?

Would it be possible to have the numbers for each year, split into
Nov/May dates as before, for actions initiated on behalf of DPBAC?

I appreciate your time

Yours sincerely,
Cathy Fox

From: Andrew Vallance 2 December 2014

Dear Cathy Fox,

The only people authorised to give DA Notice advice to the British media on behalf of the DPBAC are myself and my two deputies. No one called Michael Shrimpton has ever contacted the DPBAC Secretariat, and I very much doubt that any editor would have paid any heed to any DA Notice ‘advice’ he might have attempted to offer them, given that the simplest Google search gives full details of the scope of the System and the personalities of the DPBAC and its Secretariat. As I said to you before, the D/DA Notice System is very poorly understood, and it is often thought of as having powers which it has never had and been responsible for actions which were in no way connected to it. Shrimpton’s claims are just another example of this.

The terms of the 5 standing DA Notices set the boundaries for DA Notice advice; all DA Notice advice offered to the media falls within those boundaries, and advice is never given on issues which fall outside them. In the context of the DA Notice System, the 5 standing DA Notices are taken to define ‘UK national security’.

I am not prepared to go into any further detail about the individual occasions on which DA Notice advice has been offered to the UK media.

I should also be grateful if you would desist from further correspondence, given that your repeated questioning has become burdensome and vexatious. I believe I have given you all the information that transparency could reasonably require.

Sincerely,
Andrew Vallance

.
Dear Andrew Vallance,

Thank you for your response and the replies you gave which were
useful.

On the webpage it states “DPBAC is committed to practising a policy
of maximum disclosure of its activities consistent with the
effective conduct of business and the need to ensure that it
honours any assurance of confidentiality given to the individuals
and organisations with which it deals.”

You appear not to have met the claim above by failing to state how
the understanding comes about on the “code of confidentiality”,
which you state is the foundation stone of the DA Notice system is
reached, whether in writing, spoken or unspoken.

Further you chose not to answer how many times DPBAC initiated
actions in the last 5 years on the dubious grounds that somehow you had
given me all the information that transparency could reasonably
require.

I shall acquiesce to your request to desist from further
correspondence, after this email. However I refute that 3 emails on
pertinent and legitimate points  could be taken by any
reasonable person to be “repeated questioning that has become
burdensome and vexatious”.

My last question,
Reading the DA notice below, if an agent or officer of a secret
service mentioned in a) was a paedophile and abused children, is it
not entirely possible that there arises a conflict of interest in
that if the paedophilia was exposed, national security could be
said to be at risk and newspapers asked not to publish?

Indeed bearing in mind that paedophiles are open to blackmail, is
it not likely that agents or officers are chosen because they are
paedophiles, and are able to be “turned” to do what their bosses
and people who wield real power wish them to do?

If their bosses are in fact paedophiles, as is alleged with
Oldfield and Hayman, then the situation gets more complicated,
especially when a different secret service realises this.

This is one reason why people believe D / DA notices have been
used/misused to cover up paedophilia.

Can you state categorically that no D/DA Notice 05 has been used,
and that use has not inadvertently or deliberately covered up abuse of
children?

DA – Notice 05: United Kingdom Security & Intelligence Services &
Special Services

Information falling within the following categories is normally
regarded as being highly classified. It is requested that such
information, unless it has been the subject of an official
announcement or has been widely disclosed or discussed, should not
be published without first seeking advice:

(a) specific covert operations, sources and methods of the Security
Service, SIS and GCHQ, Defence Intelligence Units, Special Forces
and those involved with them, the application of those methods*,
including the interception of communications, and their targets;
the same applies to those engaged on counter-terrorist operations;

(b) the identities, whereabouts and tasks of people who are or have
been employed by these services or engaged on such work, including
details of their families and home addresses, and any other
information, including photographs, which could assist terrorist or
other hostile organisations to identify a target;

(c) addresses and telephone numbers used by these services, except
those now made public.
Rationale. Identified staff from the intelligence and security
services, others engaged on sensitive counter-terrorist operations,
including the Special Forces, and those who are likely targets for
attack are at real risk from terrorists. Security and intelligence
operations contacts and techniques are easily compromised, and
therefore need to be pursued in conditions of secrecy. Publicity
about an operation which is in train finishes it. Publicity given
even to an operation which has been completed, whether successfully
or not, may well deny the opportunity for further exploitation of a
capability, which may be unique against other hostile and illegal
activity. The disclosure of identities can prejudice past, present
and future operations. Even inaccurate speculation about the source
of information on a given issue can put intelligence operations
(and, in the worst cases, lives at risk and/or lead to the loss of
information which is important in the interests of national
security. Material which has been the subject of an official
announcement is not covered by this notice.

* even when used by the National Crime Agency (NCA). This is
intended purely to protect national security and not to inhibit
normal reporting on law enforcement.

Yours sincerely,

Cathy Fox

DA – Notice 05: United Kingdom Security & Intelligence Services & Special Services

  1. Information falling within the following categories is normally regarded as being highly classified. It is requested that such information, unless it has been the subject of an official announcement or has been widely disclosed or discussed, should not be published without first seeking advice:(a) specific covert operations, sources and methods of the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ, Defence Intelligence Units, Special Forces and those involved with them, the application of those methods*, including the interception of communications, and their targets; the same applies to those engaged on counter-terrorist operations;(b) the identities, whereabouts and tasks of people who are or have been employed by these services or engaged on such work, including details of their families and home addresses, and any other information, including photographs, which could assist terrorist or other hostile organisations to identify a target;(c) addresses and telephone numbers used by these services, except those now made public.
  2. Rationale. Identified staff from the intelligence and security services, others engaged on sensitive counter-terrorist operations, including the Special Forces, and those who are likely targets for attack are at real risk from terrorists. Security and intelligence operations contacts and techniques are easily compromised, and therefore need to be pursued in conditions of secrecy. Publicity about an operation which is in train finishes it. Publicity given even to an operation which has been completed, whether successfully or not, may well deny the opportunity for further exploitation of a capability, which may be unique against other hostile and illegal activity. The disclosure of identities can prejudice past, present and future operations. Even inaccurate speculation about the source of information on a given issue can put intelligence operations (and, in the worst cases, lives at risk and/or lead to the loss of information which is important in the interests of national security. Material which has been the subject of an official announcement is not covered by this notice.

* even when used by the National Crime Agency (NCA). This is intended purely to protect national security and not to inhibit normal reporting on law enforcement.

andrrew vallance

Andrew Vallance

da notice committee2013w500

DA Notice Committee

Links

[1] 2014 Nov 1 Cathy Fox blog D Notices https://cathyfox.wordpress.com/2014/12/01/d-notices-da-notices-don-hale-and-d-notice-committee/

[2] 2014 Nov c 28? Court News UK  Shrimpton Spy Killing is  A Wild Conspiracy http://courtnewsuk.co.uk/newsgallery/?news_id=38995

[3] Cathy Fox FOI Request https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/da_notices_index_and_other_infor?nocache=incoming-591686#incoming-591686

[4] http://www.dnotice.org.uk 5 standing D notices available here

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About cathy fox blog on Child Abuse

the truth will out, the truth will shout, the truth will set us free...
This entry was posted in cathy fox blog, Child sexual abuse, D notices, Freedom of Information Request and tagged , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

9 Responses to A little more on D notices

  1. Tom Bateman says:

    What an extremely patronising response you got!

    Tom

    Sent from my iPhone

  2. pippakin says:

    Reblogged this on Thinking Out Loud and commented:
    Patronizing and dismissive. How important Mr Vallance must be to consider three emails ‘burdensome and vexatious.

  3. l8in says:

    Reblogged this on L8in.

  4. Pingback: cathys foxs site on child abuse its worth a read believe me | meggiemom342

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