Malcolm Jack Raywood Court of Appeal 8th November 1982

Please note that victims of abuse may be triggered by reading this information. The Sanctuary for the Abused [A] has advice on how to prevent triggers.  National Association for People Abused in Childhood [B] has a freephone helpline and has links to local support groups. Other useful sites are One in Four [C]  and Havoca [D]. Useful post on Triggers [E]  from SurvivorsJustice [F] blog.

Redaction Some reports have had victims names redacted and some assault details redacted. This is a difficult balance-  normally I would think that  I should not “censor” details but on consultation with various people I have taken the decision to redact. This is mainly to protect victims, their friends and relatives from unnecessary detail and to stop the gratification of those who seek salacious details. In addition to the obvious “victims redaction” I have thus “assault redacted” on descriptions of assaults but not on the charges themselves. It appears to make no large difference to the vital information for researchers that these documents contain. That information is mainly names of the perpetrators, past addresses, and the charges they faced – on which newspapers are pathetically inaccurate. If you think that the balance is not correct or that a particular redaction needs reconsideration, please say.

For An Index / Timeline of Court Appeal Documents on Cathy Fox Blog [1]

This post is relevant to Paedophilia around Piccadilly Part 4- Playland Trial and Cover Up [2]
[ 1982] EWCA Crim J1108-2

No. 1745/B/81

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice

Monday, 8th November 1982
Before:

The Lord Chief Justice of England (Lord Lane)

Mr. Justice Boreham

and

Mr. Justice Stephen Brown

Regina
v.

Malcolm Jack Raywood

(Transcript of the Shorthand Notes of Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd., 36-38
Whitefriars Street, Fleet Street, London, EC4Y 8BH. Telephone Number:
01-583 7635. Shorthand Writers to the Court.)

MR. L. GIOVENE appeared on behalf of the Appellant.

MR. COLIN NICHOLLS, Q.C. and MR. A. JONES appeared on behalf of the Crown.

JUDGMENT

(As approved by Judge)

THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE : This is an appeal against conviction by leave of
the full Court. The appellant, Malcolm Jack Raywood, on 17th March last
year at the Central Criminal Court before His Honour Judge Lawson and a
jury was convicted of buggery upon a youth called Youth A. He was
sentenced to six years’ imprisonment to run concurrently with then in fact
being served.

Youth A was a boy 16 years of age, who had left home. At the
material time the appellant was the subtenant of a flat in East London,
where he lived with another man called Andrew-Cohen. The appellant had a
garage and a spray shop in which he worked on old cars. Youth A after
leaving home, had gone to various places and led an odd sort of existence.
He had, among other things, spent time with a man in Lambeth, time on a
farm and also visited Knightsbridge Hotel. It seems plain that for a period
he stayed in the appellant’s flat and helped the appellant with the motor
car business which he was running.

It is plain from the way the evidence went that the police had been keeping
observations, and the upshot of that was that Youth A was questioned. He
described an occasion when, according to him, the appellant had [assault redaction]
him at the flat, and he said that he had had the same sort of experience
before with another man. Youth A, after being arrested, was asked
questions about the appellant,  [assault redaction]. In short, Youth A
was inconsistent.

There was a further contradiction demonstrated between the evidence of
Youth A and that of the doctor who was responsible for examining
Youth A after his arrest. The doctor’s view was that although in his view
[assault redacted] had been committed upon Youth A on a number of occasions,
yet in the doctor’s view no such act had taken place within the
48 hours immediately preceding Youth A’s arrest. [assault redaction]. So there was a further
contradiction between the evidence of the doctor and the evidence of
Youth A.

The prosecution were in that difficulty, and the defence no doubt made most
of the inconsistencies and contradictions. It is alleged at the forefront
of his argument before this Court by Mr. Giovene, appearing on behalf of
the appellant, that the learned Judge failed properly to direct the Jury in
those circumstances. It is submitted by him that the learned Judge should
have directed the jury in effect to disregard the evidence of Youth A and
to place no reliance on him at all. It is said that the learned Judge was
wrong to direct the Jury to look for corroboration of Youth A’s evidence
and then, if they found corroboration, to act upon it if they saw fit.

The way in which it is put in the notice of appeal is this:

“…. the learned trial Judge misdirected the jury in such a way as to render
their verdict impossible to uphold. The learned trial Judge ought to have
directed the Jury on the following lines, ‘You must be satisfied beyond
doubt that Youth A is telling the truth that he is a witness whose
evidence is intrinsically credible. If you are so satisfied, and only if,
does the question of corroboration arise. The law is not, that a witness
who in the eyes of the Jury is not creditworthy can be made creditworthy by
other evidence. Only a witness who is creditworthy in the opinion of the
Jury ought to be nevertheless corroborated by other creditworthy evidence
before a conviction is arrived at. If having considered the evidence of
Youth A very carefully indeed in the light of the warning Just received
and with this warning in mind you say to
yourselves we are sure he is telling the truth then you can act upon his
evidence even if there is no corroboration’.”

The way the learned Judge in fact directed the jury was this: “Now let me
turn to matters which are also matters of law which you have to be directed
upon. You have quite rightly been told that this is a sexual case and
therefore, corroboration is required. That has application to cases not
only in relation to boys, but also in relation to cases concerning young
ladies and even older ladies. Whatever the nature of the case may be,
experience in these courts over many years has shown that young ladies,
young men or older ones do, on occasion, tell stories, tell tales, which
are untrue. Therefore, the law says that in that situation, what is
required is corroboration.

“When I say ‘required’, members of the jury, that is not to say that the
law blinds itself, because what it says is this: you ought not to convict
on the unconfirmed, uncorroborated evidence of somebody who is making a
complaint. You are entitled, having been given the appropriate warning that
you should not do it, to look at the evidence of that person and say, ‘We
believe it’. It is not the way in which you are asked by the Crown to look
at this case, because the Crown itself says that if you were to look at the
evidence of Youth A alone, you might, at the end of it, say, ‘We are not
sure on that evidence’. It is not a case, really, in which anybody would
say to you you are entitled to convict without confirmation or
corroboration. So it is necessary in due course to look to see what
corroboration there is here.”

The learned Judge then goes to explain in terms which are impeccable what
is meant by corroboration and also to explain to the jury, again in terms
which are not criticised, their function in the realms of corroboration,
pointing out that it is not for him to say what is corroboration but merely
point out what is capable of being corroboration.
In fact the only corroborative evidence which there was, a matter to which
we shall have to return our attention in a moment, was an alleged oral
admission to police officers in a police station at a later stage. Mr.
Giovene, as I have already said, submit that the evidence of Youth A was
so unsatisfactory that it was evidence which was not capable of being
corroborated at all. It was valueless, and therefore corroboration of
valueless evidence is not necessary and it should have been dismissed there
and then. He has drawn our attention to the well known opinions of the
House of Lords in * Kilbourne * (1973) 57 Cr. App. R. 381 and *
Boardman * (1975)
60 Cr. App. R. 165 , and the equally well known passage in Cross on
Evidence, Fifth Edition, at page 208.

It seems to us that there are three possible situations with regard to this
type of evidence. At the lowest rung is evidence by a complainant which is
totally incredible. That is the type of evidence which of course is not
affected by corroboration, because it is valueless and there is nothing to
corroborate. The second type of evidence is where the witness is
unsatisfactory in certain respects, but not totally incredible. In those
circumstances the jury should be directed as they were in the present case,
to act on such evidence only if it is corroborated by evidence which the
jury thinks convincing. The third possibility is where the evidence of the
complainant is totally credible. That is the type of situation where,
although a warning about corroboration should be given, yet nevertheless it
is open to the jury, even in the absence of corroboration, to convict if,
after due warning has been given, they are of the conclusion that the
witness is totally credible.

In the view of this Court, as I have indicated, the evidence here came into
the second category, and it was accordingly open to the jury, on the basis
that they found corroborative evidence which was satisfactory to them, to
convict if they so thought fit.
The evidence which was the only possible source of corroboration has itself
been the subject of criticism by Mr. Giovene. He says that that evidence
was so unsatisfactory that any conviction based upon it should be, in the
view of this Court, unsafe and unsatisfactory. He draws assistance from the
decision of this Court in * Pattinson and Laws * (1974) 58 Cr. App. R. 417
. That was the well known case where police officers reported an alleged
confession which was made by one of the defendants, so they said, whilst he
was shaving in police custody, and the Court took the view that the whole
circumstances of that confession were so riddled with suspicion that it
would not be safe for any conviction to be based upon it, and accordingly
the conviction was quashed.

What happened in the present case was this. The officers, according to
them, were engaged in taking the appellant’s fingerprints. During the
course of that procedure in the cell, they had a conversation with him of
which no contemporaneous note was taken, which resulted in the following
exchanges – I purposely omit the beginning of the conversation, which it is
not necessary to read. The officer made it plain to the appellant that
observations had been kept and that he had seen the appellant with two
youths, Youth B and Youth A, at the flat. So said the officer it would be
silly to deny that. In the course of his replies the appellant said: “You
are more clever than I thought. Just tell me one thing. Out of those three
boys you have mentioned, who is the oldest?” The Judge interpolates: “One
pauses to ask, why was that question asked, if it was asked, and there is a
dispute about that which you will have to resolve.”

The officer said: “I think they are all about the same age. Why do you ask
that?” Answer: Because I am only going to admit to having sex with one of
them.” “Who are you talking about?” “Youth A firstname.” “Do you mean Youth A, the
one that is called Youth A nickname?” “Yes.” “What did you do to him?” “I
[assault redacted]] .” “But Youth A
has said that you [assault redacted]] him against his will.” Answer: “Never.”
Question: “Have you [assault redacted] him?” Answer: “I was not the first to do that
to him.” The Judge tells the jury: “This, you will remember, is said to
have been said on 7th September and you must ask yourselves what the
significance of that is, coming as it did from this defendant. “I was not
the first to do that to him.”

Mr. Chapman said: “What do you mean?” Answer: “He came to me from somebody
else.” “Who?” “You do not expect me to answer that.” “Are you talking about
David Archer?” There was no reply to that and the officer said: “We know
Youth A came to you from Archer.” Answer: “In that case you know who is
responsible then.” Then Mr. Chapman said: “The fact still remains that
Youth A has said that you [assaulted] him.” Answer: “I did …

[assault redaction about 8 lines]

It is perfectly true that at a later stage, not very long afterwards, the
defendant, as he then was, in answer to another police officer, denied that
he had ever committed this offence with Youth A. He denied it then and
also at the trial. But the way in which these questions follow each other
convinces us, as indeed they plainly convinced the jury, that what the
police were saying was true. We find nothing unsafe or unsatisfactory about
the way that interview went.

The appellant has a further complaint, which he has set out in extenso in
his manuscript grounds of appeal, which we have read. He complains,
understandably, that documents in the way of police ledgers and so on,
which might very well have cast some light upon the occasion upon which
this
conversation was said to have taken place were not available. The reason
they were not available was because the police station where this matter
had taken place had been moved, if not demolished, and in the course of the
move the various books and documents had been lost. It does not seem to us,
with respect to the appellant, that that is a matter of which very much can
be made. Indeed Mr. Giovene properly informed us that he does not wish to
take any further point upon it.

So one reaches the situation where a prima facie unsatisfactory witness,
whose evidence is to some extent contradicted by what the doctor says, is
supported by evidence which is not merely corroborative but which on its
own, quite apart from Youth A, had the jury accepted it, would have been
amply sufficient to found a conviction. So much so had we felt any doubt
upon the first argument put forward by Mr. Giovene, which we do not, we
should have no hesitation at all in applying the proviso. However it is not
necessary to do that, because in our Judgment the way in which the learned
Judge dealt with this matter, the way in which he left it to the Jury,
leaves no room for criticism.

For these reasons this appeal against conviction is dismissed.

(The Court heard submissions on sentence)

THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE : Mr. Giovene with commendable restraint suggests to
us that we might extend mercy to this man who, in respect of the buggery of
Youth A, was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment, to run concurrently
with a sentence of five years which had been passed upon him a few weeks
before, in respect of a charge of attempted buggery upon a much younger boy.

It is difficult to see how the learned Judge in this case could have passed
a sentence any less than the one which he did without making the whole
exercise derisory. This man was already serving five years for attempted
buggery. The sentence of six years passed as a concurrent sentence, was
appropriate to the crime and resulted in a correct overall sentence.
Accordingly the application for leave to appeal is refused.

(The Court refused to certify a point of law of general public importance)

Please note that victims of abuse may be triggered by reading this information. The Sanctuary for the Abused [A] has advice on how to prevent triggers.  National Association for People Abused in Childhood [B] has a freephone helpline and has links to local support groups. Other useful sites are One in Four [C] and Havoca [D]. Useful post on triggers [E] from SurvivorsJustice [F] blog.

Links

[1] Cathy Fox Blog 2015 May 8 [constantly updated] An Index / Timeline of Court Appeal Documents on Cathy Fox Blog https://cathyfox.wordpress.com/2015/05/08/a-timeline-of-court-and-ewca-documentation-on-cathy-fox-blog/

[2] 2015 May 6 Cathy Fox blog Paedophilia around Piccadilly Part 4- Playland Trial and Cover Up  https://cathyfox.wordpress.com/2015/05/06/paedophilia-around-piccadilly-part-4-playland-trial-and-cover-up/

[A] Sanctuary for the Abused http://abusesanctuary.blogspot.co.uk/2006/07/for-survivors-coping-with-triggers-if.html

[B] NAPAC http://www.napac.org.uk/

[C] One in Four http://www.oneinfour.org.uk/

[D] Havoca http://www.havoca.org/HAVOCA_home.htm

[E] SurvivorsJustice Triggers post http://survivorsjustice.com/2014/02/26/triggers-what-are-they-and-how-do-we-work-through-them/

[F] SurvivorsJustice Blog http://survivorsjustice.com/

This is all written in good faith but if there is anything that needs to be corrected please email cathyfox@bigfoot.com

cathyfox the truth will out, the truth will shout, the truth will set us free

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the truth will out, the truth will shout, the truth will set us free...
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3 Responses to Malcolm Jack Raywood Court of Appeal 8th November 1982

  1. Pingback: Timeline of Court and EWCA Documentation on Cathy Fox blog | cathyfox blog

  2. Pingback: Paedophilia around Piccadilly Part 4 Playland Trial and Cover up | cathyfox blog

  3. Pingback: Paedophilia around Piccadilly Part 5 1980s and Operation Circus | cathy fox blog

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