Marius Nejloveanu, Bogdan Nejloveanu. 20 July 2011. Court of Appeal

In this appeal the sentences were slightly varied for individual convictions, but I think one overall sentence was the same whilst the other was increased. The Nejloveanus ran brothels / massage parlours Shangri-La, Belle Air, in Manchester and Cleopatras in Bury.  His Barrister Ms Elizabeth Jane Nicholls said that the brothels operate with the cooperation of the police [p82] and Inland Revenue taxed it! They were sentenced alongside David Greenwood.

This post will be referenced in [3] Cathy Fox Blog to be published Sex Slavery – Slave Girl Return to Hell by Sarah Forsyth and Tim Tate

For indexes of Court of Appeal Documents and newspaper articles:

An Index / Timeline of Newspaper Articles on Cathy Fox Blog [1]

An Index / Timeline of Court Appeal Documents on Cathy Fox Blog [2]

[2011] EWCA Crim 1953 1
[2011] EWCA Crim 1953

No: 2011/0913/A1 & 2011/0916/A1

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London, WC2A 2LL

Wednesday, 20 July 2011
Before:

The Vice President

(Lord Justice Hughes)

Lord Justice Aikens

Mr Justice Calvert-Smith

Reference by the Attorney General Under S.36 of the Criminal Justice Act
1988

Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of WordWave International
Limited A Merrill Communications Company 165 Fleet Street London EC4A 2DY
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838 (Official Shorthand Writers to
the Court)

The Solicitor General appeared in person with Mr E Brown QC

Mr A Compton appeared on behalf of the Offender Marius Nejloveanu

Mr A McGee appeared on behalf of the Offender Bogdan Nejloveanu

JUDGMENT

(As Approved by the Court)

1. THE VICE PRESIDENT : Her Majesty’s Solicitor General seeks leave to
refer under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 sentences on two
men, who are father and son, for repeated offences of trafficking girls for
sexual purposes, controlling their prostitution and ill-treating them.

2. The story revealed by a long indictment was a depressing narrative of
depravity, callous exploitation and brutality, especially in the case of
the son, Marius. The sentences passed were long and very long in the case
of the son, Marius. In his case they totalled 21 years. In the case of
Bogdan, the father, they totalled six years. The son Marius, who was born
in August 1987, was either 20 or 21 at the time of these offences. His
father Bogdan was at the material time about 48 or 49. They are Romanian by
origin. The judge rightly described them as being ‘in the business’ of
running and controlling prostitutes. In some cases that may mean organising
their trade and benefiting from the willing prostitution of themselves by
women who are perfectly able to choose their way of life. Even then it is
an offence but such an offence pales into insignificance besides the
circumstances of this kind of case and of these facts in particular.

3. In this case girls were tricked deliberately into travelling to the
United Kingdom. Once here they were compelled to prostitute themselves when
they resisted doing it. That was true of both these defendants. In
addition, in the case of Marius, he achieved his end by brutal violence,
including humiliating and repeated rapes. Bogdan (the father) had been in
the business of controlling prostitutes for some time and had his own
stable of girls. Quite apart from that, he helped his son to control the
women whom his son brought here. He helped him to bring them to the United
Kingdom. It was that part of his behaviour which was the subject of this
indictment. In relation to the girls the subject of this indictment, Bogdan
was not guilty of any violence himself but he was well aware of his son’s
methods and he continued to play his part in their control and organisation
knowing that. He was not accused of any offence of rape.

4. There were five girls brought into this country who were the subject of
the indictment. All but one of them was under 21. None of them had been a
prostitute before coming under the corrupting control of one or other of
these defendants and four of them not before arriving in this country. Two
of them were tricked into coming to this country because they thought that
the son, Marius, was in love with them. His interest was in fact deeply
cynical. The last two of the five girls had significant learning
difficulties to the extent that they were unable to carry out more than the
simplest of tasks for themselves and the second of them was largely
incapable of even looking after herself without assistance.

5. They were all forced to act as prostitutes. They were moved from house
to house rented by the defendants for use as brothels. One of the women was
taken to Holland in the hope that she would be able to bring in more money
by working there. Another of them, the first in time, was sold against her
will as if she was a commodity to another man in London who thereafter
exploited but also assaulted and raped her. These women were treated with
utter contempt.

6. The son Marius enforced his control by habitual violence. He was
convicted of assaulting all five of these women, not once but repeatedly.
Two of them he repeatedly raped. The second of those two was one of the
learning disabled women whom he raped in the most humiliating of
circumstances. She was a reluctant prostitute. He forced her in front of
others to insert objects into her rectum in order to accustom her to anal
intercourse. Some of the women tried to run away. The first, whom Marius
had originally pretended to love and whom he had then sold into the hands
of the stranger in London, managed to return to Romania where she
complained to the local authorities. When Marius heard of this he arranged
for her to be threatened on the telephone by Romanian contacts. Shortly
after that she married and moved to Portugal. Marius traced her there and
sent her a threatening email, telling her that if she returned to Romania
he would hunt her down. Much later, during the course of the second of two
trials that were necessary, he arranged for this woman to be threatened and
offered money in an effort to prevent her from giving evidence. At much the
same time he contacted another of the women, a potential witness, from
prison and asked her to visit him. He made telephone calls from prison
suggesting ways in which the women might be prevented from giving evidence.

7. The principal offences lasted for about a year running from the late
part of 2007 to the autumn of 2008. The defendants left the country and had
to be traced to Romania and extradited back here under a European Arrest
Warrant. They, and particularly Marius, did everything they could to avoid
trial and conviction. Marius gave open instructions that he might well
plead guilty if, but only if, he was satisfied that the women would really
give evidence against him. No doubt he hoped that they would not. When with
some difficulty it was demonstrated that they would, he refused
nevertheless to admit his guilt. He frustrated the first trial by
dismissing his lawyers. In the second he instructed them to take no
significant part and not to cross-examine the women, except that he
asserted the first was an impostor. Neither of the men gave evidence;
neither of them would admit his guilt.

8. A very significant feature of this case is that whilst on remand
awaiting trial, Marius was discovered to have been making arrangements to
continue his criminal lifestyle as if he had never been arrested. He
contacted a third man with whom he had formally been involved in
prostitution. He made arrangements through this man to contact yet another
potential victim. The object was to induce her to come to the United
Kingdom. His purpose was transparently the same as before, to add her to
his stable. Moreover, his method was the same as before. He wrote her a
letter declaring his love for her and he told his partner in crime that she
had to be persuaded that he wanted to marry her “because she would fall for
that”. That determined attempt to continue his criminal behaviour was
reflected in a further count of conspiracy to traffic this unidentified
woman, count 32 on the indictment.

9. Sentencing these defendants was a complex and demanding task for the
judge who had heard the trials. The indictment contained 32 counts and
could have contained more. As the judge rightly said, what mattered was the
overall sentence and not the details of its construction. If he had simply
added up what might have been individual sentences if any of these offences
had stood alone, the total would not have reflected the overall
criminality. We are sure that he was right to adopt this approach. There
was inevitable overlap between the offences. The trafficking had as its purpose enabling
the defendants to control the women’s prostitution. Thus the trafficking
and controlling counts overlapped. The violence merited separate counts but
it was also a serious aggravating feature of both the trafficking and the
controlling counts. The violence was also associated with the rapes of the
two women on whom Marius inflicted that additional indignity. In the
context of this case the rapes were as much part of the controlling of
these women as they had any more conventional motive. For these reasons to
the extent that any written submissions laid before us hint at the
suggestion that the judge should have added up separate sentences for rape,
violence, trafficking and controlling prostitution, we do not agree.

10. The judge’s method of structuring his sentence was to impose long
sentences of 15 and 12 years concurrent to each other on the defendant
Marius for the repeated rapes of the two women thus treated. He then
imposed further sentences concurrent to one another but consecutive to the
rape sentences and totalling five years for the trafficking, controlling
and assault counts. Lastly, he added one year further for the conspiracy
committed in prison. Thus 15, plus five, plus one: 21 years in all. The
judge might have taken the view that in particular count 7, a count of
witness intimidation, called for a consecutive sentence, but the overall
difference to the sentence would have been relatively small. Overall we are
satisfied that the judge was right to ask himself the single question: what
was the right total?

11. In the case of Marius two questions are raised. The first is whether,
long as 21 years is, it can nevertheless be described as unduly lenient.
The second is whether the judge erred in principle in not passing an
indefinite sentence of imprisonment for public protection. It is convenient
to take the second of those questions first.

12. The judge found that the statutory conditions for passing a sentence of
imprisonment for public protection were met in the case of Marius. He did
pose a significant risk of causing serious harm through committing further
similar offences. There is and can be no challenge to that finding. The
making of a sentence of imprisonment for public protection is nevertheless
a matter of judicial judgment and discretion, assuming that the basic
statutory criteria is met, as it was here. The judge undoubtedly had in
mind the general principle endorsed by this court that a sentencing judge
needs to address the question of whether, particularly in the case of a
lengthy determinate sentence, such sentence will itself address the risk
that the man presents. It is apparent that that was his reason for not
imposing a sentence of imprisonment for public protection. He said that he
took into account the very long sentence imposed. He also took into
consideration Marius’ age and, significantly, the prospect that his
behaviour would change with the passage of the years.

13. We entirely endorse the general principle but are unable to see how it
could reliably be applied to the present case. True it is that a
determinate sentence of 21 years means by statute that the defendant will
serve 101/2 years including of course the time on remand, before he is
released. The difficulty we have is with the proposition that it can
reliably be said that those 10 years will be sufficient to alter his
behaviour and to remove the risk which he undoubtedly presents at the
moment. The indications to the contrary are found in part in the very grave
catalogue offences that he has committed, but even
more, as it seems to us, in the determination that he demonstrated after he
had been caught and locked up to continue doing the same thing again.

14. We should record that we have raised with counsel a question which so
far as we know has not been addressed in the courts before and through no
fault of the judge was not before him. It is this. This defendant is a
Romanian national. The offence that he has committed is such and the
sentences imposed on him are such, that he will undoubtedly be deported as
and when he is released. We have had helpful submissions upon how a
sentence of imprisonment for public protection affects a prisoner in his
circumstances. As a matter of law his situation is identical to any other
subject of a sentence of imprisonment for public protection. His case will
have to be addressed by the Parole Board which will ask itself the
question, modelled on section 28 of the Crime Sentences Act 1997, whether
it is any longer necessary for the protection of the public that he should
remain locked up. The difficulty comes in making that assessment as a
matter of practicality in the case of a foreign national prisoner. In the
case of a domestic prisoner the planning for possible release is a
carefully thought-out process. Typically it involves not only work with the
prisoner in custody, but planning for progressive release into the
community. Typically it will involve progressive posting to a less secure
prison and eventually to an open prison and will involve brief periods and
gradually longer periods of home release in order to see whether he can
cope and whether he remains a risk. Typically it will involve conditions of
residence. Always it will involve carefully formulated licence conditions
designed to control his behaviour, monitored by probation officers and
others. None of that is in practice possible for a foreign national
prisoner who is going to be deported more or less immediately on release.
Licence is impossible and planning for the kind of progressive stage
release which we have indicated is the practice is also impossible.

15. We are quite satisfied that those realities are relevant considerations
for any court which is asking itself whether as a matter of discretion a
sentence of imprisonment for public protection ought or not to be imposed.
We are quite satisfied that in some cases the answer will be that such a
sentence is not called for, for those reasons, because the effect of those
practicalities may be that if it is imposed the prisoner will in practice
scarcely be available for release and may at the very least spend very much
longer in custody than would an equivalent domestic prisoner.

16. Accordingly, we have asked ourselves in this case whether that factor
ought to lead us not to impose the sentence of imprisonment for public
protection which we are quite satisfied otherwise ought to be imposed. Such
is the danger that this man presents that we are persuaded that it would be
wrong not to impose a sentence of imprisonment for public protection. We
remind ourselves that in assessing danger to the public we are concerned
not only with the danger to those who are resident in this country, but
also to those elsewhere to whom the defendant is a risk. We are satisfied
that he is such a risk and he is at the moment demonstrating such
determination to be a risk that the only right course is a sentence of
imprisonment for public protection.

17. That being so, we do not propose to address any further the question of
the length of the minimum term. Some judges might have made it rather
longer. It is very much in the right bracket. Had we made it a little
longer it would have made very little difference
in practice. In his case accordingly, we vary the sentence to one of
imprisonment for public protection. The minimum term will be 101/2 years
less time served in custody which will be the figure taken by the judge in
the court below.

18. That leaves the case of Bogdan, the father. We approach his case on the
basis that at least so far as the girls who were the subject of this
indictment are concerned he was guilty personally of no violence towards
them. Some of the girls drew a sharp distinction between son and father in
the way in which they were treated. The picture is not, however, unmixed
because there were references even in their evidence to some incidents of
assault – not on these girls but on the people who were described as “his
own girls”. But we approach his case on the basis that he did not fall to
be sentenced not only for rapes but also for assault, either as a principal
or as a secondary party. We also accept that the assertion that he had
spoken to his son of his son’s assault on one of the women, in terms of
suggesting that he ought not to damage “the goods of the business”, is not
reliably attributed to him. It looks as if it is a summation of an argument
rather than founded on sound evidence.

19. That said, what this man did was, with a background of unconvicted
management of other women, to associate himself and give active assistance
to his son in what he knew perfectly well was his son’s trafficking and
controlling, and which was backed up by brutal violence as he well knew. He
gave his assistance in the knowledge of what was happening to these girls
and he was party to their being tricked.

20. The judge’s sentences were made up, broadly speaking, by taking the
concurrent sentences that he had passed for the trafficking and controlling
offences upon the son Marius and applying them to Bogdan. He made one
sentence of two years consecutive to another of four, making thus six in
all. All other sentences were concurrent. As is the case with Marius, we
entirely endorse the judge’s approach of asking himself what the overall
sentence would be, rather than attempting to construct a total out of
individually justifiable components. There is the same overlap as there was
in the case of Marius.

21. It remains, however, the case that the relevant guideline of the
Sentencing Guidelines Council provides for a starting point of six years
after trial for a trafficking case in which there is coercion. This was not
one trafficking case in which there was coercion, this was five trafficking
cases in which there was coercion. We are in no doubt that six years for
the father in all his circumstances was not enough. We propose to vary the
sentence in his case in this way. The judge’s sentences will stand with the
exception of the last trafficking count, count 25. That related to one of
the particularly vulnerable women and is the last count that came after a
history of similar behaviour. We vary the sentence on that count from two
years to three, and we make it consecutive to count 9 and the remainder.
That is to say overall four plus two plus three equals nine. Towards that
sentence time spent in custody will count according to the number of days
notified to the judge.

22. Those accordingly are the sentences which these men must now serve.

23. In the case of Marius the sentence of imprisonment for public
protection ought to be attached to the rape counts.

Please note that victims of abuse may be triggered by reading this information. The Sanctuary for the Abused [A] has advice on how to prevent triggers.  National Association for People Abused in Childhood [B] has a freephone helpline and has links to local support groups. Other useful sites are One in Four [C]  and Havoca [D]. Useful post on Triggers [E]  from SurvivorsJustice [F] blog. Jim Hoppers pages on Mindfulness [G]  and Meditation [H] may be useful.

Links

[1] Cathy Fox Blog 2015 May 8 [constantly updated] Index Timeline of Newspaper Articles on Cathy Fox Blog https://cathyfox.wordpress.com/2015/05/23/newspaper-stories-index-timeline/

[2] Cathy Fox Blog 2015 May 8 [constantly updated] An Index / Timeline of Court Appeal Documents on Cathy Fox Blog https://cathyfox.wordpress.com/2015/05/08/a-timeline-of-court-and-ewca-documentation-on-cathy-fox-blog/

[3] Cathy Fox Blog to be published Sex Slavery – Slave Girl Return to Hell by Sarah Forsyth and Tim Tate

 

[A] Sanctuary for the Abused http://abusesanctuary.blogspot.co.uk/2006/07/for-survivors-coping-with-triggers-if.html

[B] NAPAC http://www.napac.org.uk/

[C] One in Four http://www.oneinfour.org.uk/

[D] Havoca http://www.havoca.org/HAVOCA_home.htm

[E] SurvivorsJustice Triggers post http://survivorsjustice.com/2014/02/26/triggers-what-are-they-and-how-do-we-work-through-them/

[F] SurvivorsJustice Blog http://survivorsjustice.com/

[G] Jim Hopper Mindfulness http://www.jimhopper.com/mindfulness/

[H] Jim Hopper Meditation http://www.jimhopper.com/mindfulness/#cultivate

This is all written in good faith but if there is anything that needs to be corrected please email cathyfox@bigfoot.com

cathyfox the truth will out, the truth will shout, the truth will set us free

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About cathy fox blog on Child Abuse

the truth will out, the truth will shout, the truth will set us free...
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One Response to Marius Nejloveanu, Bogdan Nejloveanu. 20 July 2011. Court of Appeal

  1. Pingback: An Index and Timeline of Court & Court of Appeal, EWCA Documents on Cathy Fox Blog | cathyfox blog

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